The correct positioning of organs during embryonic development requires multiple cues. The Xenopus cement gland is a mucus‐secreting epithelium that is a simple model for organogenesis, allowing detailed analysis of this complex process. The cement gland forms at a conserved anterior position, where embryonic ectoderm and endoderm touch. In all deuterostomes, this region will form the stomodeum (primitive mouth) and, in some aquatic larva, will also form a cement gland. In recent years, a model has been put forward suggesting that (...) an intermediate level of BMP signaling in the ectoderm leads to cement gland formation. We propose an alternative model whereby, during gastrulation, the cement gland (CG) is positioned by the overlap of three domains, corresponding to anterodorsal identity (AD), ventrolateral identity (VL), and ectodermal outer layer identity (EO), defining the equation (AD + VL + EO = CG). Anterodorsal identity requires a contribution by the transcription factor Otx2 while ventrolateral identity requires the BMP4 signaling pathway. These postional cues are integrated to activate cement gland differentiation. This integration appears to require intermediate steps, including expression of pitx genes, and members of the ATF/CREB and Ets transcription factor families. BioEssays 25:717–726, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The brain ventricular system is a series of connected cavities, filled with cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), that forms within the vertebrate central nervous system (CNS). The hollow neural tube is a hallmark of the chordate CNS, and a closed neural tube is essential for normal development. Development and function of the ventricular system is examined, emphasizing three interdigitating components that form a functional system: ventricle walls, CSF fluid properties, and activity of CSF constituent factors. The cellular lining of the ventricle both (...) can produce and is responsive to CSF. Fluid properties and conserved CSF components contribute to normal CNS development. Anomalies of the CSF/ventricular system serve as diagnostics and may cause CNS disorders, further highlighting their importance. This review focuses on the evolution and development of the brain ventricular system, associated function, and connected pathologies. It is geared as an introduction for scholars with little background in the field. (shrink)

A unique feature of the vertebrate brain is the ventricular system, a series of connected cavities which are filled with cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and surrounded by neuroepithelium. While CSF is critical for both adult brain function and embryonic brain development, neither development nor function of the brain ventricular system is fully understood. In this review, we discuss the mystery of why vertebrate brains have ventricles, and whence they originate. The brain ventricular system develops from the lumen of the neural tube, (...) as the neuroepithelium undergoes morphogenesis. The molecular mechanisms underlying this ontogeny are described. We discuss possible functions of both adult and embryonic brain ventricles, as well as major brain defects that are associated with CSF and brain ventricular abnormalities. We conclude that vertebrates have taken advantage of their neural tube to form the essential brain ventricular system. (shrink)

In his seminal paper introducing the fine structure of L, Jensen proved that under \ any regular cardinal that reflects stationary sets is weakly compact. In this paper we give a new proof of Jensen’s result that is straight-forward and accessible to those without a knowledge of Jensen’s fine structure theory. The proof here instead uses hyperfine structure, a very natural and simpler alternative to fine structure theory introduced by Friedman and Koepke.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hazel E. Barnes FLAUBERT AND SARTRE ON MADNESS IN KING LEAR T'oward the end of the second volume of The Family Idiot (L'Idiot de la famille), in a section called "Exercises and Reading," Sartre discusses Flaubert's reading of Shakespeare.1 In the context Sartre describes how Flaubert spent his time during one of the rare periods when he was not even attempting to write anything; more than two years (...) elapsed between the completion of the first Sentimental Education in January 1845 and die beginning of his collaboration widi Maxime Du Camp on La Bretagne. Along with doing desultory background reading for "an oriental tale," and analyzing the plays ofVoltaire, Flaubert claimed to be studying the Greek and Roman authors and a selected few of the later "great immortals." Sartre shows that Flaubert's way of reading them was entirely different from the critical analysis which he directed on the work of his contemporaries. Essentially it was a series of"rereadings," and its purpose was not to gain knowledge or even a fuller understanding of the text. In a letter to Mlle de Chantepie, Flaubert counsels her to take one of the great writers and "study him in depth," reading from beginning to end and then starting over again: "But do not read, as children read, to amuse yourself, nor as the ambitious read, to instruct yourself. No, read so as to live. Create in your soul an intellectual atmosphere which will be compounded from the emanation of all the great minds."2 How can Flaubert both counsel his correspondent to study in depdi and not to seek instruction? The kind ofstudy he has in mind, Sartre claims, is comparable to the way in which an amateur pianist might "study" Chopin, where die aim is not to understand analytically but to perfect a particular interpretation and to evoke a certain aesdietic reaction. Flaubert resists instruction because new knowledge risks forcing change. What he wants is 211 2 1 2 Philosophy and Literature to rediscover the same eternal truths and emotions.3 It is also to find inspiration for his own dreams, an oneiric reading. In this connection Sartre makes two important points. First, in striving to cultivate for the soul "an intellectual atmosphere... compounded from the emanation of all the great minds," the artist is adding so many strings to his lyre — the laugh of Rabelais, the cosmic passions of Shakespeare, the skepticism of Montaigne. This is whyJules at the end of die first Sentimental Education plans to study die great writers, beginning with Homer — not to learn dieir technique but to enlarge the artist's sensibility. Sartre's second point is made apropos of Flaubert's rereading of Shakespeare. Flaubert fluctuates between two responses. Sometimes he is depressed at the thought of his own lack of genius in comparison with Shakespeare. "That good man will drive me mad.... All odiers seem to me children beside him."* At odier times he experiences what Sartre calls a "glorifying identification." It is as though in imagination he becomes Shakespeare. In part this is because, as he writes in this same letter, we artists "breathe in our existence by means of die sentence." Sartre notes that for Flaubert the existence in question is a literary reality, not that of die everyday world; we may breathe it in either dirough writing or through reading. At this particular moment in his life, Sartre argues, Flaubert's program of study was in bad faith. He allowed die imaginary identification to suffice. Sartre goes so far as to say, "He reads in order not to write; in diis masturbatory substitute for the act, he makes himself an aumor all at once, under anodier name, in order not to work at becoming the writer of genius he wants to be." This comment makes sense if we recall Flaubert's situation in 1845-47. After the nervous crisis at Pont-L'Evêque he knew that either he would be a writer or he would remain a feeble invalid, an object of pity, the "family idiot." "There he is, dien, paralyzed by two opposing forces: hope and die fear of being disappointed " (p. 2021). No wonder he... (shrink)

The paper studies the historical background for the ‘idealist’ reading of Spinoza usually traced back to British and German Idealism. Here, I follow this history further back than and focus on one earlier idealist reading, indeed perhaps the mother of them all. It can be found in the _Elucidarius cabalisticus, sive reconditae Hebraeorum philosophiae brevis et succincta recensio_ by Johann Georg Wachter, a kabbalist interpretation of Spinoza published in 1706. I am principally interested in the importance that Wachter’s book (...) may have had for German philosophy in the second half of the eighteenth century. Focusing on Moses Mendelssohn’s _Philosophische Gespräche_ of 1755, I argue that, via Mendelssohn, the Elucidarius cabalisticus is perhaps the earliest possible source of the idealist reading of Spinoza that dominated the German _Spinozabild_ from throughout the _Pantheismusstreit_ up to the second edition of Herder’s 1800 _Gott: Einige Gespräche_, culminating with Hegel’s ‘acosmist’ reading of Spinoza in the 1825–26 lectures on the history of philosophy. (shrink)

With the rise of analytical philosophy the criticism against Hegelianism has become increasingly shrill, and signs of an embarrassment that Hegel's philosophy should ever have arisen are noticeable in such inftuential works as those of Karl Popper and Hans Reichenbach, to mention but a few. However, many contemporary philosophers stress what is called subjectivity, conceiving reality as susceptible of methodical analysis only to the extent that it is in and for the subject. What is more, they not only insist on (...) the importance of the subject for philosophy, but maintain that the subject must be conceived as the principal determinative of true objectivity. Since knowledge depends for its possibility on the inseverable correlatives of consciousness and reality, they would grant that a proper importance must be given to both subject and object. Still, exemplifying the relational principle within the unity of a dual structure, the subject serves as an exclu sive agent that provides ingress into the meaning of the object. (shrink)

I am impressed by how angry Jonathan Crewe is, but I found his remarks confused and unclear and so I’m uncertain how to reply. Whatever the matter it, he wants “to forestall a sense of academic obligation on anyone’s part to work back to Cavell through Bruns” . God knows this might be a good idea, judging from what James Conant says.Conant’s criticisms are directed at the section of my paper called “The Moral of Skepticism,” which he cannot help wanting (...) to rewrite, since he has a much more intimate grasp of Cavell’s thinking than I have. I imagined myself on the outside of Cavell’s texts, trying to characterize them in a certain way, not on the inside, giving an account of their genesis. Obviously my paper is neither philosophy nor literary criticism but a crossdressing of the two that is bound to make someone like Crewe bite his teeth. I appreciate Conant’s forbearance. Gerald L. Bruns is William and Hazel White Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of Notre Dame. His most recent book is Heidegger’s Estrangements: Language, Truth, and Poetry in the Later Writings. (shrink)

“The Avoidance of Love” is Cavell’s magic looking glass onto Shakespeare, where the idea of missing something, not getting what is obvious, is, on Cavell’s reading, very close to a philosophical obsession. Shakespeare here means—besides Lear—Othello, Coriolanus, Hamlet, The Winter’s Tale, and Antony and Cleopatra, and what Cavell finds in these plays is an attempt to think through what elsewhere, in the formation of the modern philosophical tradition, was getting formulated as the problem of skepticism, or not being able to (...) know that we know . It is not easy to say what this means. As if executing a skeptical decorum, Cavell’s writing does not try for transparency, nor does it always coincide with itself, and anyhow Shakespeare is not so much an object as a region of Cavell’s thinking, so everyday readers are apt to find themselves a bit at sea with him. Without claiming to match Cavell’s views point for point, I would like to give something like a para-Cavellian commentary that tries to say what his thinking, with respect to Shakespeare, seems to be getting at, and also where it leaves us.Gerald L. Bruns is William and Hazel White Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of Notre Dame. His most recent book is Heidegger’s Estrangements: Language, Truth, and Poetry in the Later Writings. (shrink)

Hazel Barnes's study, published simultaneously with volume One of the English translation of Sartre's The Family Idiot and designed to bear considerable resemblance to it in physical appearance, deals with the latter work in its entirety. It is to Barnes's translation of Being and Nothingness that an entire generation of Anglophone philosophers has turned, and she has long been regarded as a leading expert on Sartre's thought. The present book will strengthen that reputation.

" La formule cartésienne causa sive ratio scande l'histoire de la causalité, entre le privilège suarézien de la cause efficiente et l'invention leibnizienne du principe de raison suffisante. Elle traverse un siècle exactement, des Disputationes metaphysicae de Suarez (1597) aux 24 thèses métaphysiques de Leibniz (1697). La métaphysique s'y constitue en époque de la causalité. Qu'ils la soutiennent ou qu'ils la récusent, les philosophes du XVIIe siècle ont en commun de discuter la thèse qui confère l'intelligibilité à la relation (...) causale ; elle prend la forme exemplaire de l'équivalence cartésienne de la cause et de la raison. Mais la façon dont la relation causale gagne l'intelligibilité demeure à son tour inintelligible, puisqu'elle renvoie à la toute-puissance incompréhensible de celui qui l'exerce, y compris peut-être envers lui-même : sui causa. C'est là précisément la thèse que les post-cartésiens ne cesseront de lire comme un problème et de récuser : Spinoza, en posant que l'ordre et la connexion des idées sont les mêmes que l'ordre et la connexion des choses ; Malebranche, en faisant de la cause occasionnelle une raison inefficace et en concentrant en Dieu toute l'efficace ; Leibniz, en employant le principe de raison suffisante, qui rationalise l'existence en la soustrayant à l'emprise de l'efficience. Loin de la produire, la causalité se voit alors soumise, sous diverses modalités, à l'intelligibilité. Aussi le principe de raison suffisante signe-t-il ce que nous appelons la fin de la cause - par excellence la fin de l'efficience -, qui n'est pas la fin de la question du fondement, mais le déplacement de sa réponse vers plus fondateur que la cause : la raison. Ainsi se trouve accomplie l'essence du fondement à l'époque moderne de l'histoire de la métaphysique. " V. C. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez à LeibnizSteven NadlerVincent Carraud. Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez à Leibniz. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002. Pp. 573. € 42,00.Over the last two decades, there has been a good deal of outstanding work on the problem of causation in early modern philosophy. Some of it has been devoted to first-order (...) questions: for example, on whether this or that thinker allows for real causal activity among finite substances (and which ones). Other studies, by contrast, have focused on second-order questions, especially the proper formulation of the causal principle itself. Vincent Carraud's book is primarily concerned with second-order questions, although it does have something to say with respect to first-order questions as well. But the depth and breadth of this study makes it much more than just another entry in the ongoing discussion over who thought what about causality among the early moderns. Carraud has a large and complex story to tell: the development of the principle of sufficient reason in the seventeenth century. In particular, he wants to know which philosophers can truly be said to have adopted that principle in its most rigorous formulation. It is both a philosophical and a historical story, and it appears in what is surely one of the most important and interesting books in early modern philosophy in recent years.Carraud directs our attention to a particular phrase that originates with Descartes but then seems to reappear (in various forms) throughout the period: causa sive ratio, "cause or reason." Every term in the phrase is subject to interpretation, of course—'cause,' 'reason' and especially 'or'—and the thesis it embodies (and a philosopher's attitude toward it) is a function of how those terms are to be understood. Carraud's interest is in what this phrase can tell us about how a select group of philosophers (primarily Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche and Leibniz) regard the relationship between causality and intelligibility.The story begins with Suarez, the late sixteenth-century Scholastic. Suarez's contribution to the rise of the principle of sufficient reason is modest but crucial. He privileges efficient causation over all of the other Aristotelian varieties. While he still grants some explanatory role for formal, material and final causes, they have lost their status as "true" causes for Suarez; in fact, they qualify as causes only by analogy with efficient causation. As Carraud reads Suarez, the ratio causae belongs properly only to the efficient cause, since it alone can provide the reason for the existence and being of a thing.It is Descartes, however, who occupies the central role—both historically and philosophically—in Carraud's story. For it is he who truly effects the ultimate reduction (or, as Carraud puts it, unicité) of causality. In the Cartesian scheme, all but efficient causes are banished. Moreover, the efficient cause of an effect is now defined as the sufficient cause, one that explains why the effect is as it is. "La primauté et l'absoluité de la cause lui viennent de ce qu'elle rend raison de l'effet... Les causes sont d'abord les raisons (suffisantes) des effets, en quoi elles les expliquent" (199-200). Moreover, with Descartes we find a universal application of the principle of causality to all things, even to those that previously either were not regarded as sufficiently real to need a cause (the objective reality of ideas) or were regarded as standing outside the domain of causality altogether (God). It is not that God is a caused being for Descartes. Rather, the important thing is that God is, like all existing things, subject to the causal question. That is, it is legitimate to ask why God does not need a cause. And, in Carraud's account, this is where ratio comes in to its own. God is not a caused being, but there is a reason (in God's immense power) why God does not require a cause. Moreover, the only analogy we have for thinking of the way in which God's immensity forestalls God needing a cause is in terms of efficient causality itself... (shrink)

I Several years ago, when the Carter administration announced that it would support congressional action to end the public fund ing of abortions, the President was asked at a press conference whether he thought that such a policy was unfair; he responded, "Life is unfair." His remarks provoked a storm of controversy. For other than those who, for principled reasons, opposed abor tion on any grounds, it seemed that the President's comments were cruel, violating what was thought to be an (...) American com mitment to providing equal access to health services to all citi zens, regardless of their capacity to pay. Those sentiments had, in fact, been reflected in public opinion polls that had, for at least three decades, indicated that Americans supported the propo sition that the government should guarantee health care to all. Ultimately, those beliefs had been translated into the oft-ex 1 pressed political demand for a one-class system of health care. This commitment to equality is rather remarkable. American society evidences a striking willingness to tolerate vast inequal ities with regard to income and wealth. While it guarantees ed ucation to all children, there is not even a pretense that the children of the wealthy and the children of the poor ought to get precisely the same kind of schooling. While some commitment 'Hazel Erskine. "The Polls: Health Insurance," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXIX (Spring, 1975), 128-143. (shrink)

Le mérite le plus patent de Zur Kritik der Gewalt de Benjamin consiste à défaire toute représentation innocente de la violence et de ses usages, toute compréhension de la violence qui n’y verrait que l’innocuité d’un moyen neutre légitimé, ou pas, par les fins qu’il vise, les intérêts qu’il sert ou les classes qui le mobilisent. « Dans cette perspective, la violence est un produit naturel, en quelque sorte un matériau brut dont l’utilisation ne pose aucun problème ». S’interroger sur (...) la viole... (shrink)

This contribution explores in detail the presence and the context of two quotations of the philosopher and theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (Algazel for the Latin world) in Albert the Great’s late Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. The two quotations, which concern the notion of the soul as “abridged letter” or “copy” [nusḫa muḫtaṣara, chartula brevis] on which all pieces of knowledge are potentially transcribed, occur in two significant textual points of Albert’s Summa. Two different aspects of al-Ġazālī’s (...) simile are addressed in the article: the consideration of the soul as a book, which has extremely wide biblical and literary echoes, and the consideration of the soul as a place, also with regard to the already Aristotelian, and then Albertinian notion of locus intelligibilium. The feature the two passages by Albert share is the acknowledgment of Algazel as a source of primary importance, capable of corroborating with his authority both a Christian theological doctrine and the littera itself of Aristotle’s De anima, in a culturally momentous philosophical-theological, and Islamic-Christian, cooperation. Thanks to a focused analysis on further contexts of reception of the same Ġazālīan image, which bear witness to its peculiar memorability and its differentiated usages, the article argues in conclusion in favour of a more attentive and in-depth study of philosophical similes such as the one here discussed. (shrink)

A supposer que le concept de valeur soit un concept empirique, qui a sa source dans l'expérience, de quel type est l'expérience de la valeur? Dans les pages suivantes, je suggère qu’Ehrenfels et Meinong ont apporté certaines améliorations substantielles à la position de Brentano. Ces améliorations résident essentiellement dans les deux points suivants : (1) les volitions se caractérisent par une dimension « active » ou conative qui fait défaut aux sentiments, ce qui interdit de les ranger dans une seule (...) et même « classe » de phénomènes psychiques ; (2) le concept de valeur trouve son origine empirique dans les volitions ou les phénomènes conatifs, non dans les sentiments ou phénomènes affectifs. (shrink)

This article surveys most of the recent reviews of Sarah Richmond’s excellent new translation of L’Être et le néant. It offers some close textual comparisons between Richmond’s translation, Hazel Barnes’ translation, and the Checklist of Errors of Hazel Barnes’ Translation of L’Être et le néant. This article concludes that Richmond delivers a higher semantic resolution translation that overcomes nearly all the liabilities found in Barnes and does so without sacrificing much by way of readability.

Cet article traite de la question de la relation entre la vérité, la liberté et l’identité dans la pensée de Michel Foucault. En considérant la cri-tique de Foucault par Charles Taylor, dans son article «Foucault on Freedom and Truth», j'analyse les implications de l’hypothèse répres-sive sur la sexualité et la prétendue impossibilité d'une libération par la vérité. Le refus par Foucault de considérer l’identité homosexuelle comme une identité fixe relevant d’une connaissance de soi nous conduit à son projet d’existence (...) esthétique. Cette vie créatrice, comme nous le verrons dans ses cours Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres, implique un certain rapport à soi qui nécessite néanmoins un rapport à l’autre. Au sein de ce rapport, ainsi que dans le vouloir-dire-vrai de la parrêsia, on trouve des conceptions de vérité et de liberté qui échappe-raient à la critique taylorienne et qui s'ouvrent sur d'autres possibilités de pratiques de la liberté. (shrink)

Cet article traite de la question de la relation entre la vérité, la liberté et l’identité dans la pensée de Michel Foucault. En considérant la cri-tique de Foucault par Charles Taylor, dans son article «Foucault on Freedom and Truth», j'analyse les implications de l’hypothèse répres-sive sur la sexualité et la prétendue impossibilité d'une libération par la vérité. Le refus par Foucault de considérer l’identité homosexuelle comme une identité fixe relevant d’une connaissance de soi nous conduit à son projet d’existence (...) esthétique. Cette vie créatrice, comme nous le verrons dans ses cours Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres, implique un certain rapport à soi qui nécessite néanmoins un rapport à l’autre. Au sein de ce rapport, ainsi que dans le vouloir-dire-vrai de la parrêsia, on trouve des conceptions de vérité et de liberté qui échappe-raient à la critique taylorienne et qui s'ouvrent sur d'autres possibilités de pratiques de la liberté. (shrink)

Cet article traite de la question de la relation entre la vérité, la liberté et l’identité dans la pensée de Michel Foucault. En considérant la cri-tique de Foucault par Charles Taylor, dans son article «Foucault on Freedom and Truth», j'analyse les implications de l’hypothèse répres-sive sur la sexualité et la prétendue impossibilité d'une libération par la vérité. Le refus par Foucault de considérer l’identité homosexuelle comme une identité fixe relevant d’une connaissance de soi nous conduit à son projet d’existence (...) esthétique. Cette vie créatrice, comme nous le verrons dans ses cours Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres, implique un certain rapport à soi qui nécessite néanmoins un rapport à l’autre. Au sein de ce rapport, ainsi que dans le vouloir-dire-vrai de la parrêsia, on trouve des conceptions de vérité et de liberté qui échappe-raient à la critique taylorienne et qui s'ouvrent sur d'autres possibilités de pratiques de la liberté. (shrink)

L’introduzione al fascicolo Analogia e medioevo sive vent’anni di analogie presenta il numero 18 di "Doctor Virtualis" e traccia le tappe fondamentali della rivista. Si delineano dapprima alcune linee della storia della rivista e le sue ispirazioni teoriche e storiografiche principali, per poi mettere in luce le ragioni della rilevanza del tema dell’analogia, come oggetto utilizzato e pensato nei secoli medievali e come strumento di ricerca storiografica, e infine si conclude con l’articolazione del fascicolo. The introduction to the issue (...) Analogy and the Middle Ages sive twenty years of analogies presents issue n. 18 of Doctor Virtualis and traces the milestones of the journal. It first sketches some lines of the history of the journal and its main theoretical and historiographical inspirations, then highlights the reasons for the relevance of the theme of analogy, as an object used and thought of in the medieval centuries and as a tool for historiographical research, and finally concludes with the articulation of the issue. (shrink)

Many writers in various fields--philosophy, religion, literature, and psychology--believe that the question of the meaning of life is one of the most significant problems that an individual faces. In The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, E.D. Klemke collects some of the best writings on this topic, primarily works by philosophers but also selections from literary figures and religious thinkers. The twenty-seven cogent, readable essays are organized around three different perspectives on the meaning of life. In Part I, the readings assert (...) and defend the theistic view that without the existence of God--or faith in God--life has no significance or purpose. In Part II the selections deny this thesis, defending instead the humanistic alternative--that life has or can have meaning and worth without any theistic beliefs or commitment. In the final group of readings, contributors ask if the question of the meaning of life is in itself legitimate and significant. The volume also includes an introduction by the editor and a selected bibliography. This new edition adds essays by A. J. Ayer, Hazel Barnes, William Lane Craig, Owen Flanagan, Antony Flew, Thomas Nagel, Kai Nielsen, Philip L. Quinn, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Walter T. Stace. The only anthology of its kind, The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, is ideal for courses in introduction to philosophy and human nature. It also provides an accessible and stimulating introduction to the subject for general readers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Su irez NORMAN j. WELLS IT HAS LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGEDthat Francisco Sufirez's distinction between a formal and an objective concept exercised some influence upon Descartes's teaching on 'idea'.' It would appear, however, that not enough attention has been given to that distinction of Sufirez (and especially to another to be mentioned shordy) to aid in dispelling what I take to be (...) a widespread confusion and misunderstanding with regard to 'idea' in Descartes, especially with respect to 'idea' taken 'objectively'. Much, if not all, of the confusion in question has to do with Descartes's admittedly equivocal use of the term 'idea'. For he had allowed that 'idea' could be taken 'materially' (materialiter), on the one hand, for the knowing activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it could be taken 'objectively' (objective) for the thing (res) represented by that knowing activity.' At this point, the contemporary reader can only be brought up short, See E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cart~sien (New York: Burt Franklin Reprint, 1912), 48-49; Discours de la m~thode: Texte et commentazre (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 321; G. Rodis-Lewisin her edition of Meditationes de Prima PhRosoph.m (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 41 n. 1; L'oeuure de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), 53~ n. 8; J. Collins, Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 165;T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objecttve Being m Descartes and SuArez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); "Objective Reality of Ideas in Human Thought: Descartes and Su~rez," Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, SJ., eds. V. F. Daues, S.J., M. R. Holloway, S.J., L. Sweeney, S.J. (Milwaukee : Bruce, 1966), 68-79; L. Gilen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes zur zeitgenossischen Scholastik," Scholastik 32 (1957): 41-66; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la th~orie cart6sienne de l'&re objectif," Revue d'histoire de la philosophic 3 (1929): 464-72;J. Owens, C.S.S.R., in The Cambridge HtstoU of Later Medu,val Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 459; G. Nuchelmans,Judgment and Propositwnfrom Descartesto Kant (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983), 36-54. " Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-19o9; hereafter cited according to volume, page and line), Praefatio ad Lectorem, 7: 8. 19-251 "Sed respondeo hic subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae." It is clear that two realities are to be causally accounted for. The [33] 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 conditioned as we are by an appreciation of 'objectivity' altogether extramental! It makes for a considerable wrench of perspective to do justice to Descartes's acknowledged doctrine of intramental objectivity and an intramental 'thing represented' (resrepraesentata). 'Idea', then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designates the act of representing as well as the 'thing represented '. S Yet, for all this, and despite repeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency in the history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret 'idea' taken 'objectively' as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to be Descartes's constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers that function which is proper to the cognitive activity, mind is the efficient cause of its cognitive activity. With respect to ideas taken 'objectively', such as the ideas of God and the triangle on the levels of metaphysical and mathematical intelligibility, an efficient cause, extrinsic to the mind, is certainly at issue. For here we are in the presence of what is independent of the mind, however intramental it may be. On the triangle, see Medit. 5; 7: 64. ]4s7 : "...est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sire essentia, sive forma, immutabUis et aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente mea dependet." For the idea of God, see Medit. 5; 7: 68. l o-12: "Nam sane multis modis inteUigo illam [ideam... (shrink)

Sarah Richmond’s translation makes an important contribution to Sartrean scholarship. L’Etre et le néant was first translated by Hazel Barnes in 1956 but it contained various errors. Richmond also had access to the internet and to Sartre’s French and German sources. Her edition also contains an Introduction and a ‘Notes on the translation’ section.Sartre published his work in 1943 and, unable to access all the works he cited, he often did so from memory. He also adopted certain translators’ neologisms: (...) for example, Corbin’s translation of Heidegger’s Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?, and when he quoted Nietzsche, he used two different translations, and he quotes Spinoza using a text by Hegel. He quotes a line from the playwright Beaumarchais without clarifying the context.Sarah Richmond deals with many of these problems and also notes that the French gender system can be problematic. Also, Sartre’s neologisms rendered finding English equivalents difficult. This is an excellent translation. (shrink)

Review Jopling's discussion is carried on with remarkable clarity. His presentation of the diverse philosophical positions is balanced and fair. . . . Self-Knowledge and the Self is a work of excellent, sound scholarship, a most significant contribution. Hazel Barnes, author of Sartre and Flaubert Jopling's book is the most sustained and serious contemporary philosophical reflection on the Delphic injunction Know thyself of which I am aware. Drawing on literature and psychotherapy as well as solid argumentation, it gently but (...) persuasively exposes inadequacies in the individualistic theories of Hampshire, Sartre, and Rorty and sketches the advantages of a more dialogic approach. Ideally, readers should come away not only knowing what it means to know oneself, but also, in some respects, actually knowing themselves better!. William L. McBride, author of Social and Political Philosophy In this impressive survey, Jopling not only provides incisive critiques of the major contemporary theories of self-knowledge but also introduces a significant alternative approach, one that stresses the role of dialogue and communication. Ulric Neisser, editor of the Author David A. Jopling is Associate Professor of Philosophy at York University in Toronto. (shrink)

Al maestro inglese sono attribuite due opere di logica: la Logica sive tractatus de veritate propositionum e le Consequaentiae, entrambe scritte molto probabilmente intorno al 1360. In queste opere Ferrybridge elabora due teorie dell'inferenza, diverse tra loro e caratterizzate in modo originale rispetto alla tradizione coeva. Nel presente saggio l'A. si propone di ricostruire ed analizzare le due teorie, individuandone analogie e differenze e tentando di determinare la loro posizione nell'ambito della tradizione logica medievale, con riferimento alle tesi di (...) Buridano, Pietro di Mantova, Paolo Veneto, Walter Burley. Dopo un'analisi contenutistica dei due testi, l'A. giunge a stabilire tre importanti differenze tra essi: la prima è costituita dal fatto che nella Logica viene formulato esplicitamente un criterio generale per determinare la necessità di un enunciato condizionale, mentre nelle Consequaentiae non vi è traccia di tale tentativo; la seconda riguarda il fatto che mentre nelle Consequaentiae viene rifiutata la validità delle consequaentiae con antecedente impossibile o conseguente necessario, nella Logica tale validità viene pienamente accettata; la terza differenza infine è data dalla diversa classificazione delle consequaentiae formulata nelle due opere. In appendice viene pubblicata l'ultima parte della Logica e cioè un trattato dedicato alla determinazione delle condizioni secondo cui un enunciato condizionale è necessario. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:François H. Lapointe PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY ThL· survey is limited to articles written in English that have appeared in journals published between 1 January 1974 and 31 December 1976. Abbott, Don. "Marxist Influences on the Rhetorical Theory of Kenneth Burke." Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (1974): 217-33. Abel, Lionel. "Jacques Derrida: His 'Difference' With Metaphysics." Salmagundi no. 25 (1974): 3-21. Adamowski, T. H. "Character and Consciousness: D. (...) H. Lawrence, Wilhelm Reich, and Jean-Paul Sartre." University of Toronto Quarterly 43 (1974): 31 1-34. Adams, D. J. "Style and Social Ideas in Jacques le fataliste." Studies in Voltaire & the Eighteenth Century 124 (1974): 231-48. Adams, Hazard. "Contemporary Ideas of Literature: Terrible Beauty or Rough Beast?" Contemporary Literature 17 (1976): 349-77. Adorno, Theodor W. "Lyric Poetry and Society." Telos no. 20 (1974): 56-71. Ages, Arnold. "Bonald and the Jews." Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa 44 (1974): 32-43. Allen, Diogenes. "The Experience of Existence: Jean-Paul Sartre and Iris Murdoch." International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1974): 181-87. Allen, Marcus. "Character Development in the Oreste of Voltaire and Les Mouches of Jean-Paul Sartre." CLA Journal 18 (1974): 1-21. Alter, Jean. "A (Terrorist) System of the Novel." Diacritics 6 (1976): 10-15. Altieri, Charles. "Wittgenstein on Consciousness and Language: A Challenge to Derridean Literary Theory." MLN 91 (1976): 1397-1423. Altieri,Charles. "Wordsworth's 'Preface' as Literary Theory." Criticism 18 (1976): 122-146. [On Wordworth and Wittgenstein.] Ames, Van Meter. "Art for Art's Sake Again?" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1975): 303-307. Appleman, Philip. "The Dread Factor: Eliot, Tennyson, and the Shaping of Science." Columbia Forum, N. S. 3 (1974): 32-38. Armstrong, Paul B. " E. M. Forster's Howard's End: The Existential Crisis of the Liberal Imagination." Mosaic 8 (1974): 183-99. Arnold, A. James. "La Condition humaine as Nietzschean Tragedy." Mélanges Malraux Miscellany 6 (1974): 15-24. 366 François H. Lapointe367 Aronson, Ronald. "L'Idiot de la famille: The Ultimate Sartre?" Telos no. 20 (1974): 90-107. Arthos, John. "Du Bartas, Petrarch and the Poetry of Deism." Rice University Studies 60 (1974): 1-17. Artz, Johannes. "Newman as Philosopher." International Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1976): 263-88. Ausmus, Harry J. "Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Language." The Midwest Quarterly 18 (1977): 169-86. Ayala, Francisco. "Ortega y Gasset, Literary Critic." Critical Inquiry 1 (1974): 395-414. Bakalar, H. Nicholas. "The Cartesian Legacy to the Eighteenth-century Grammarians." MLN 91 (1976): 698-721. Barnes, Hazel. "Apotheosis and Deification in Plato, Nietzsche and Huxley." Philosophy and Literature 1 (1976): 3-24. Baron, Dennis E. "Role Structure and the Language of Literature." Journal of Literary Semantics 4 (1975): 43-52. Barooskian, Vahan D. "The Aesthetics of the Russian Revolutionary Theatre 1917-1921." British Journal of Aesthetics 15 (1975): 99-117. Bart, B. F. "Hypercreativity in Stendhal and Balzac." Nineteenth Century French Studies 3 (1974-75): 18-39. Barthes, Roland. "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative." New Literary History 6 (1975): 237-72. Bashford, Bruce. "The Rhetorical Method in Literary Criticism." Philosophy and Rhetoric 9 (1976): 133-46. Bass, Alan. "Time and the Witch: Femininity, Metapsychology and the Temporality of the Unconscious." MLN 91 (1976): 871-912. Bassett, Sharon. "Towards a Critique of Romanticism: Wordsworth, Pater and the 'Anima Mundi'." Criticism 17 (1975): 262-75. Batchelor, R. "Literature, Society and the Concept of Revolt." European Studies Review 5 (1975): 395-427. Battin, M. Pabst. "Aristotle's Definition of Tragedy in the Poetics, Part 1." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1974): 155-70, and Part II in Ibid. 33 (1975): 293-302. Bauer, George. "Sartre and the 'Sugars' of History." L'Esprit Créateur 15 (1975): 377-86. Baumgarten, Murray. "The Historical Novel: Some Postulates." Clio 4 (1975): 173-82. Beauchamp, Gorman. "Gulliver's Return to the Cave: Plato's Republic and Book IV of Gulliver's Travels." The Michigan Academician 7 (1974): 201-10. Bennett, Jonathan. "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn." Philosophy 48 (1974): 123-34. Benzon, William. "Cognitive Networks and Literary Semantics." MLN 91 (1976): 952-82. Bergonzi, Bernard. "A Grid of Codes: Views of Structuralism." Encounter 45 (1975): 52-58. Berry, Wanda Warren. "The... (shrink)

«Mettre les faits d’accord avec la philosophie de Platon»: voilà une maxime qui remonte au Commentaire de Proclus au premier livre des Éléments d’Euclide, oeuvre centrale pour la constitution du savoir au Cinquecento et plus particulièrement pour la définition du statut opératoire des mathématiques. Au cours du XVIe siècle, Euclide apparaît en effet comme le véritable médiateur entre platonisme et aristotélisme, au demeurant moins par son oeuvre de géomètre que par son geste épistémologique qui semble tracer l’unique voie possible pour (...) accéder à la connaissance de toutes les choses, soit sensibles soit métaphysiques. Les interprétations de Jacopo Mazzoni ("In universam Platonis et Aristotelis philosophiam praeludia, sive de comparatione Platonis et Aristotelis", 1597) et de Francesco Barozzi ("Opusculum, in quo una oratio, et duae quaestiones: Altera de certitudine, et altera de medietate mathematicarum continentur", 1560), que j’examine dans mon article, offrent deux perspectives différentes, qui redonnent une actualité philosophique au néoplatonisme mathématique de Proclus. (shrink)

Il volume, inserito nella collana diretta da Franco Todescan “Lex naturalis. Testi scelti di filosofia del diritto medievale”, presenta una sezione antologica di testi marsiliani introdotta da uno studio di Elvio Ancona sulla letteratura critica che nell’ultimo cinquantennio si è occupata del pensiero del Patavino. Lo studio bibliografico, in particolare, nella rivisitazione delle più recenti interpretazioni del Defensor pacis, trova occasione per interrogarsi su alcuni problemi giusfilosofici fondamentali che in quell’opera furono sollevati e sulle soluzioni che vi furono prospettate. In (...) questa prospettiva, dunque, viene esaminata innanzitutto la discussione relativa all’ispirazione di fondo della riflessione di Marsilio, riassumibile nella domanda se egli si debba ritenere “magis aristotelicus” o “magis christianus”, e a quale tipo di aristotelismo o di cristianesimo eventualmente si riferisca. Vengono successivamente considerate le principali teorie fiorite intorno alle grandi tematiche “istituzionali” del Defensor pacis, concernenti l’origine, l’organizzazione e la legislazione della civitas sive regnum, tematiche che sono state affrontate dagli studiosi ricorrendo a concezioni che andavano di volta in volta dal naturalismo al convenzionalismo, dal repubblicanesimo all’assolutismo, dalla teonomia al giuspositivismo. Ci si sofferma quindi sulla diuturna controversia che, con riguardo alla politica religiosa del legislator marsiliano, ha fatto parlare, con linguaggio spesso consapevolmente anacronistico, di “secolarismo” o addirittura “laicismo” e, alternativamente, di “cesaropapismo”. Si conclude infine con la disputa storiografica sulla collocazione del Mainardini tra medioevo e modernità, e con la valutazione delle indicazioni che, in termini di “ideologia marsiliana”, la complessa vicenda ermeneutica esaminata offre per una comprensione unitaria del significato della sua opera. (shrink)

Behind a succinct account about Euler and his connection with the philosophy, on show forth his arguments for to prove the effective existence of the absolute space in the Mechanica sive motus scientia (1736) and in the Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps (1748). These works constitute the Euler’s first approximation in defence of the doctrine of space held by Newton, and against: the Metaphysicians(Leibniz, Berkeley). This paper point at the possible ascendancy about Kant, especially in Von de m (...) ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume (1768). (shrink)

This paper deals with Bonaventure’s stand on the separability of accidents discussed within the framework of the theology of the Eucharist, in his Commentarium in Sententias, IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1. Since an accident was traditionally defined as ens in alio, the existence of accidents apart from any subject in the Eucharist was considered philosophically challenging. The Franciscan theologian has been credited with having distinguished, for the first time (Bakker PJJM. La raison et le miracle: les (...) doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250 – c.1400): contribution à l’étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie. s.n., Nijmegen, 1999; Vijgen J. The status of Eucharistic accidents “sine subiecto”: An historical survey up to Thomas Aquinas and selected reactions. München: Akademie Verlag, 2013), between the relation of accident to subject secundum aptitudinem, and the relation of accident to subject secundum actum, while sustaining that only the relation to subject secundum aptitudinem constitutes the accident’s proper definition, a view that Aquinas would subscribe to and develop further, relying on Avicenna’s idea of the real distinction between essence and existence. The chapter will discuss Bonaventure’s rather different reasons for refusing to accept actual being in alio as the accident’s essence. Bonaventure does not appeal to a distinction between being and essence but draws on the common essence of accidents in individualized substances vs. accidents as universals, or accidents secundum species sive differentias speciales. (shrink)

Peut-on être courageux mais injuste? Sage mais intempérant? Juste mais ignorant? À ces questions, Socrate le premier répondit que c’était impossible. Le plongeur amateur qui se jette la tête la première dans un puits sans savoir ce qu’il fait n’est pas courageux – seulement téméraire et stupide. Savoir. Tout est là. Mais com- ment savoir quand il n’y a personne pour vous instruire, seulement des charlatans ou des inspirés qui ne savent pas ce qu’ils disent? S’il n’y a personne pour (...) enseigner la vertu, comment pourrait-elle être un savoir? Socrate n’est pas, cependant, à un paradoxe près, et ce sont ses paradoxes qui vont nourrir des générations succes-sives de philosophes, depuis Platon et Aristote jusqu’aux philosophes hellénistiques et aux platoniciens tardifs. La vertu est-elle unique ou multiple? Quelle est son origine? Quels sont les prére- quis de son émergence? Le présent ouvrage raconte l’histoire de ces questions dans la philosophie ancienne, en montrant également leur transposition dans l’univers chrétien par l’intermédiaire d’Augustin et l’écho qu’elles trouvent jusque dans l’œuvre de Nietzsche. Alors que la problématique des vertus a gagné une actualité et une pertinence renouvelées dans les éthiques contemporaines, il était utile de rappeler la diversité des manières dont les penseurs anciens se sont débattus avec ces questions centrales.0. (shrink)

When making decisions, humans can observe many kinds of information about others' activities, but their effects on performance are not well understood. We investigated social learning strategies using a simple problem-solving task in which participants search a complex space, and each can view and imitate others' solutions. Results showed that participants combined multiple sources of information to guide learning, including payoffs of peers' solutions, popularity of solution elements among peers, similarity of peers' solutions to their own, and relative payoffs from (...) individual exploration. Furthermore, performance was positively associated with imitation rates at both the individual and group levels. When peers' payoffs were hidden, popularity and similarity biases reversed, participants searched more broadly and randomly, and both quality and equity of exploration suffered. We conclude that when peers' solutions can be effectively compared, imitation does not simply permit scrounging, but it can also facilitate propagation of good solutions for further cumulative exploration. (shrink)

Le problème principal présenté dans cet article est le point de vue philosophique ou théologique d’Einstein dans sa phrase célèbre: Dieu ne joue pas aux dés. Quel en était le concept « fondamental » de nécessité? Et avant tout: quel est ce Dieu qui ne joue pas aux dés? Est-ce un Dieu théiste, déiste ou panthéiste? Certains autres passages des écrits informels d’Einstein et de ses discours montrent qu’il était très proche du panthéisme, admirateur de Spinoza qu’il considérait comme le (...) plus grand des philosophes. Pourtant le panthéisme de Spinoza implique le déterminisme qui, probablement, n’a pas été la raison principale de son désaccord avec Dieu qui joue aux dés dans la physique quantique. Donc il est sans importance que le Dieu d’Einstein soit plus proche du Pantocrator de Newton, ou plutôt de Deus sive natura de Spinoza. Peut-être que oui, mais seulement si le Souverain universel ne punit ni ne récompense ses créatures, donc nous-mêmes, ces êtres minuscules dans ce monde immense et bien harmonisé. L’énigme est toujours posée. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), nephew of the Alsatian theologian, Albert Schweitzer, was born in Paris, passed his agrégation at the Ecole Normale Superieure in 1929, and was a lycée teacher between 1931 and 1945. He was called up to the French Army in 1939, captured by the Germans in 1940 and released after the armistice. In 1938 he published a novel, La Nausée, translated by Robert Baldick as Nausea (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), and in 1940, L'Imaginaire: Psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination, translated by (...) Bernard Frechtman as The Psychology of Imagination (London: Methuen, 1972). His major philosophical work, L'Etre et le Neant, was published in 1943, and translated by Hazel E. Barnes as Being and Nothingness (London: Methuen, 1957). As a novelist he is best known for a trilogy, Chemins de la Liberté (Roads to Freedom), comprising L'Age de raison (1945) translated by E. Sutton as The Age of Reason (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), Le Sursis (1945), translated by E. Sutton as The Reprieve (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963) and La Mort dans l'āme (1949), translated by G. Hopkins as Iron in the Soul (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965). His main work of literary criticism is Qu'est-ce que la littérature? (1947), translated by B. Frechtman as What is Literature? (London: Methuen, 1950). Plays includeLes Mouches (1943) and Huis Clos (1944), both translated by S. Gilbert and published in one volume, as The Flies and In Camera (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965). (shrink)

Après une introduction sur la vie et l’œuvre de Raoul de Longchamp, maître actif en France entre le dernier quart du xii e siècle et les deux premières décennies du xiii e, est ici éditée pour la première fois la Cornicula sive Summa de philosophia, rédigée très vraisemblablement vers dans les années 1180-1190. Tout en conférant à son traité une structure précise d’après les sphères des quatre éléments, en partant du feu jusqu’à la terre, du haut en bas du (...) cosmos, Raoul de Longchamp puise principalement dans la Philosophia de Guillaume de Conches et dans les écrits des médecins salernitains. Les sujets abordés relèvent surtout de la philosophie naturelle, tout particulièrement de la météorologie, et ils sont généralement introduits par des questions. (shrink)

In this paper edition of what is still the most useful introduction to Sartre's philosophy in English, the author has made minor revisions in the text, expanded the bibliography and provided a link between his citations from the French edition of L'Etre et le Néant and the recent English translation by Hazel Barnes.--D. D. O.